Tuesday, September 19, 2017

Do we need a new "Axial Age" to find our place in nature? Peter Brown speaks at the 1st Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Peter Brown of McGill University speaking at the Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence, september 2017.

We might summarize our present human situation by the simple statement: In the 20th century, the glory of the human has become the desolation of the Earth. And now, the desolation of the Earth is becoming the destiny of the human. From here on, the primary judgment of all human institutions, professions, programs and activities will be determined by the extent to which they inhibit, ignore or foster a mutually enhancing human-Earth relationship. —Thomas Berry (Cited by Peter Brown in "Ethics for Economics in the Anthropocene")

We are deeply stuck in a wrong paradigm. Nature - or the ecosystem, if you prefer - is not, and never was, a "resource" for humankind to grab for free. We are part of Nature and if we don't respect Nature, then everything we do will be wrong and will damage ourselves as well as all living beings.

This was the basic point of Peter Brown's talk at the Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence. I don't know if I can call it the best talk of the whole school, although I am tempted to do so. Surely, in any case, it was the one that went more in-depth into the core of the challenges we are facing. Eventually, it is all a question of ethics. And ethics means first of all respect. If we don't respect the Earth, we are not worthy of respect ourselves.

This is a fundamental point that underlies most of the current struggle. And to overcome the present impasse what we need, I think, can be summarized in the goals of the American Teilhard Association:

  1. A future worthy of the planet Earth in the full splendor of its evolutionary emergence.
  2. A future worthy of the human community as a high expression and a mode of fulfillment of the earth’s evolutionary process.
  3. A future worthy of the generations that will succeed us.

Clearly, these goals cannot come out of the postulates of current economics, nor from the optimization of an agent's utility function. It is something that goes beyond mere mechanical considerations. It is a new vision of the universe, something that I could call "A New Axial Age", a term that Peter Brown didn't use in his talk but that came to my mind while I was listening.

As you know, the term "axial age" encompasses the great changes that took place during the 1st millennium BC. Maybe the term has been overused with time, but it true that those centuries were a time of spiritual awakening, of a new vision of humanity that took place simultaneously and independently all over Eurasia, from China to Greece. And many of our current religious beliefs were laid down during that age.

It may be time for a new leap in human consciousness. A step to a higher level of understanding that would take us to include in our religious view not just our fellow human beings but all the fellow creatures inhabiting this planet. It might be a new religion if we were to follow a path similar to the ancient axial age. Or it might be a revisitation of our existing religions. After all, it is what Pope Francis is doing with Christianity, emphasizing the brotherhood (or, better, sisterhood) of all beings in an intuition that Francis of Assisi had already seen several centuries ago. 

At this point, I am sure that I have overinterpreted Peter Brown's talk, but I think this is the gist of the line of reasoning he was following. In any case, to make sure you understand Brown's ideas, here is a video of him that seems to me to be very similar to his presentation in Florence.

You may also be interested in Brown's paper "Ethics for Economics in the Anthropocene"

Monday, September 18, 2017

Reducing inequality: does it still make sense in a world of more than seven billion people? Kate Pickett's talk at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Kate Pickett spoke at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome, in Florence, on Sep 9, 2017. (the picture above is from another meeting)

Inequality is a subject rarely touched in the mainstream debate. Is probably safe to assume that the general public doesn't know that inequality not only exists, but it is rapidly growing. When the subject appears, such as when you read about Bill Gates and his ilk, the issue is normally dismissed by noting that "today, the poor have cell phones and flat-screen TVs" or maybe that "life expectancy keeps increasing."

Yet, things are not so simple and inequality is not just a question of which toys people have access to. It is also well known that the rich live longer than the poor. Inequality is a relative phenomenon and it is correlated to the perception of one's status in society. Perceiving oneself as being part of a lower stratum of society has negative effects on people's health, self esteem, social skills, and more. Kate Pickett correctly noted these issues in her talk in Florence and she built up an impressive series of data showing how inequality is bad for society as a whole. It was a point that deeply resonated with her audience. 

Of course, it is unlikely that we'll ever be able to eliminate social inequality and surely Kate Pickett doesn't propose to turn our society into some kind of Marxist paradise. But, by all means, she is right when she says that it makes sense to reduce inequality or, at least, to stop its growing trends. The problem is how. Here, Pickett's talk was weak. 

Mainly, Pickett seems to propose a return to the progressive taxes of some decades ago, but a reform in this direction seems to go against the grain of everything that's happening in our world. If the rich are in control of society (and they are) how can we convince them to tax themselves more? That underlies a bigger and unsolved problem: what are the origins of the "Great U-Turn" in the early 1980s that changed the trend from diminishing to growing inuquality? We are dealing with a poorly understood phenomenon and we don't know how to act on it. 

But there is an even bigger problem with the idea of reducing inequality: it is the size of the human population. In the 1960s, the Club of Rome had started its existence on the basis of concerns for social inequality rather than those for which it would become better known later on, the limits to growth. At that time, there were less than four billion people on the Earth. But, today, the number of people has doubled to 7.5 billion and it keeps growing. The stress on the remaining natural resources has increased, just as the problem of pollution in the form of global warming and the associated climate catastrophe. 

In these conditions, how to reduce inequality? Increasing the consumption levels of the poor implies further increasing the burden on the natural system. Maybe that could be compensated by forcing the rich to reduce their consumption levels. Unlikely, to say the least, but, even if that were possible, it wouldn't change the trend of increasing exploitation of the already overexploited natural resources. Redistribute consumption is not enough, we need to drastically reduce it if we want to avoid the Seneca Cliff awaiting our civilization. 

We should have done that 50 years ago, when it was still possible and when Aurelio Peccei and other founders of the Club of Rome were proposing it. Now, it may be too late. This apparently unsolvable dilemma was examined by Jacopo Simonetta in a post that appeared on "Cassandra's Legacy" last year, reproduced below. (see also a comment by Diego Mantilla)


Social Equality and the Destruction of the Planet

Cassandra's Legacy, Thursday, June 16, 2016

by Jacopo Simonetta

Exaggerated inequality is surely a major problem in today's societies, and it keeps increasing. I, too, certainly believe that this scandal must end, but the topic of the article is another one: is it true that redistribution of wealth would have a good effect on the Earth health? Many very influential people believe this, but I am not so sure.

Evidently, affluent people consume much more than poor people do, but how much? As far as I know, there are no studies correlating the environmental impact and social classes but, as starting point, we could compare how CO2 emissions change with income. (data Word Bank and Wikipedia respectively).  


Social equity and consumption: Comparison between per capita income (in blue) and CO2 emissions (in red). 

It is clear that CO2 emissions increase with income, but less than proportionally in the central part of the curve. In fact, in very low incomes, the increase in emissions is very fast against modest increases. Then they go up rather slowly, to return to peak with the very, very rich people. Important local fluctuations are also correlated to climate, geography, local traditions, social organisation and so on. 

Now, as a mental exercise, we can take for good the statement that 1% of the global population appropriates 50% of world income. This means that about 75 million people earn an average income of 500,000 $ per capita per year. So, let us imagine that we can distribute all this wealth among the remaining 99% of the world population (let's call it "Operation Robin Hood"). This means more or less 5,000$ per capita. Even for a large part of the western middle class, this would be a big help. For the majority of people this would drastically change one's life. Billions of people would finally eat to satiety, dress decently, live inside houses, send their children to school, heal the sick and much more. People a little higher in the income ladder could get a new car, go on holidays, and so on. 

Very good, but what would be consequences for the planet? 

Let's try to analyze the question. As a rough approximation, we can start classifying humanity in four meta-categories: the very rich (let us presume they are 1%, so about 75 millions); the affluent (let us presume 1 billion people); the Middle class (according to "The Economist", about 3 billion people); the poor (may be 2 billion), and the very poor (according to FAO, about 1 billion). 

Comparing per-capita income and emissions in different countries, and assuming that there are all the social classes in each country, we can argue that the very rich produce about 20 tons of CO2 each per year. The affluent 10 tons each; the middle 6 tons each, the poor 2 tons each, and the very poor 0,1 tons each. For a total amount of about 36 billion tons of CO2. “Operation Robin Hood" would lead to disappearance of the lower class and a perceptible improvement in the life style of the poor and the middle class. At the same time, also the super-rich would disappear, while nothing would change for the affluent people. 

And what would that mean in terms of total CO2 emissions? Well, we just multiply the per capita emissions by the total number of people per category. The result is a grand total of about 55 billions tons, that is a 50% increment with respect to the present emissions. Social equality doesn't seem to be so good for the planet.

But there is more: Operation Robin Hood would produce a sensible reduction in mortality, and probably an increment in natality too, among low wage people. So a sharp population increase, at least for one or two generations.

Evidently, that's just an example, not a realistic simulation. But the core conclusion, that a better life for the majority of people would be disastrous for the planet, is consistent with more sophisticated models available. In the 2004 edition (Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update), the Meadows group published a scenario where they supposed that since 2002 the birth rate is 2 children per woman and industrial production is equally distributed to everybody at a level 10% more than the global mean in the year 2000. It means much less for rich people and much more for the poor.

Word3 scenario with birth control and equal distribution of goods.(From Meadows et al. 2004)

Skipping the details, we can see that in this scenario there is a period of abundance that lasts some 20 years more than it does in the basic scenario (Business as Usual). But later the system collapses in a very similar way. And note that none of the people asking today for a more equal wealth distribution don't want any sort of birth rate control. We have no published scenario of what the outcome of these hypotheses wold be, but is not hard to argue that with a growing population andntemporary wealth distribution the system would collapse very quickly. 

Another model that's relevant to our topic is "HANDY, From a scientific perspective this model, derived from an ultra-famous one by Lotka and Volterra, is too simplified to represent a system as complex as an advanced society. In particular, it neglects feedbacks existing between hierarchy, social complexity, specialization and the capability of the societal system to absorb low entropy from the outside. Unfortunately, this is one of the core feedbacks which shape the evolution of human societies. This largely reduces the viability of the model and explains the absurdity of some of the scenarios proposed. Anyway, "HANDY" has the merit of being the first model to try to introduce the social element inside a dynamic model. Here are some of the results of the model.

The above result is rather absurd since it implies that the elites keep growing even after the commoners have collapse. However, on the whole, the results of this model can be seen at least as the indication that a low level of inequality tends to shape more stable and resilient societies. In my opinion, a cursory glance at history seems to confirm this hypothesis. It is consistent also with what we have said before and with Word 3. A low level of inequality produces a more cohesive society and a highly legitimate leadership which tends to lower and to extend the peak phase of a society.

But, and this is the point, social equality is not sufficient to avoid systemic collapse if society is based on non-renewable resources.

After all, we have already seen all of this in the real world. Please observe the curves of USA and China CO2 emissions from 1990 and 2010.

The US economy trudged along with a low GDP increase completely concentrated in the top class, with a deterioration of the life level in the middle and low classes. The result has been a modest reduction in emissions.

In the same time, in China the life of the large majority of people improved and emissions skyrocketed. Because of that, the population too increased, in spite of a low birthrate. Just imagine to duplicate the China experiment: do you really believe that the Planet will survive?


It is true that billionaires are rich and I am not; this makes it possible that they are greater experts than me about money and power. But, nevertheless, it seems to me that, historically, smart leadership have always managed to redistribute a part of their revenue in ways useful to consolidate their legitimacy and hence their political power. It means that a partial redistribution of incomes would be to the advantage, first of all, of the top class people. But this is a lesson that the present day élite, largely consisting of pirates and sociopaths, has apparently forgotten.

Secondly, such action surely would improve the life of the poor, but just for a short time because, if done worldwide, the experiment would end in an unimaginable global catastrophe. Does this mean we have to be thankful to our kleptocrats? I don't believe so. It means that the reduction of inequalities must be done by reducing the income of the very rich and not by improving the commoners' wages. But this perspective is refused by everyone: right and left, south and north, up and down.

Sunday, September 17, 2017

Investment as Commitment. Tim Jackson at the Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence

Tim Jackson speaks at the 1st Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence, Sep, 2017 (image courtesy of Daniel Reinhardt)

There have been several interesting talks at the Summer School on Sustainability in Florence, but the one by Tim Jackson has been among the most focused and relevant ones. Jackson is the author of the book "Prosperity Without Growth"  (2017) and he goes straight to the core of the problem, which lies in our financial system. We are geared for growth, everything in the system pushes for growth, all the financial structures are rewarding growth. And, as Jay Forrester was perhaps the first to note, economic growth is taking us straight to the Seneca Cliff. 

So, we need to re-examine the basics of our economic system and propose ways to defuse the ticking bomb that we ourselves have created. There is much to be discussed about Jackson's proposals, but one that I noted, in particular, was the concept of "investment as a commitment." I asked Jackson how this is supposed to be different than the current way of investing, and his answer was that, today, investors tend to see the market as a "gamble" in which they may gain or lose; but their main motivation is for big, short-term gains. Clearly, this is not the way that will take us to a saner and safer world. 

The key point of the whole thing, as I see the situation, is in the financial system. If we found a way to divest from fossil fuels and to move financial resources to the transition in the form of renewable energy and the related infrastructure, then there is still hope to avoid the Seneca Cliff, at least in its most brutal form. The question, then, is how to move money to some kind of "investment as a commitment"; investing for something that will last for some time and provide a steady return, not necessarily a spectacular one. 

With Jackson, I discussed the idea of money which steadily loses value with time, or "expires" after a certain length of time. Or also to the old Sumerian idea of "amargi", periodic debt cancellation; a tradition that later led to the Hebrew Jubilee. Possibly, this kind of reforms would lead people to invest in real things. Is it possible? Hard to say. Maybe someone has other ideas? 

Saturday, September 16, 2017

The Donut Has a Hole in The Middle: Kate Raworth Speaks at The Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Kate Raworth speaks at the 1st Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence, Sep 2017

Kate Raworth is best known, nowadays, for her book titled "Doughnut Economics, Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist." In Florence, she gave a very professional presentation that was very appreciated by the participants. But I remained unconvinced.

The gist of Raworth's idea is that, historically, economics as a science has been shaped in such a way to look like physics; considered by the founders of economics as an example to follow. According to Raworth, this interpretation has distorted economics, making it unable to describe the real world and to do anything to avoid the troubles we are facing, from inequality to financial collapses. 

This is a correct position: economics tends to have an approach similar to that of the physics of 19th century (or even older). It is an approach that works well for simple, linear systems, such as Newton's apple when it falls down. But Newtonian physics cannot describe the biology of an apple, just as it can't describe the behavior of the complex, non-linear system we call "the economy". 

So far, so good: a lot of people are complaining about the shortcomings of the current interpretation of Economics; the problem is what to replace it with. It would seem to be obvious to use the modern approach based on the science of complex systems, sometimes called "biophysical economics", pioneered by the authors of the "Limits to Growth" study of 1972. It is not an easy approach, but it seems to be bringing results

The problem with Raworth's book - and with her speech - is that it correctly identifies the problem, but provides no credible alternative. The book is full of qualitative diagrams and discoursive suggestions, but few real world data. Many of the recommendation that Raworth provides are attractive, but they are never quantified, just as the "doughnut" that gives the title to the book. It is a nice diagram, but how to apply it in practice?

As I said, I remain unconvinced about this doughnut idea. It seems to be lacking something fundamental; maybe it is because it has a hole in the middle. 

In the following, I reproduce my previous comment on Raworth's book. 

by Ugo Bardi

Doughnut Economics: a step forward, but not far enough

Doughnut Economics, by Kate Raworth (Chelsea Green, 2017) is an interesting book that goes in the right direction in the sense that it promotes a circular economy, But it leaves you with the impression that it missed that extra step that would have led it to define the goal in the right way. Bridging the gap between standard economics and biophysical economics is still far away.

So, what is this "Doughnut" that gives the title to the book? Initially, I had imagined that it was supposed to be a sort of mandala representing the concept of circular economy. But that doesn't seem to be the case: circular mandalas often represent the cyclical movement of a wheel, but the doughnut doesn't (as, indeed, most doughnuts are not supposed to be used as wheels). Here is how it is represented in the book:

It is described as "a radically new compass for guiding humanity this century." Ambitious, to say the least, but how is that supposed to work, exactly? Maybe I am missing something, but I not sure I can understand why the numerous concepts appearing in the figure should be arranged in a "doughnut."

The problem with the doughnut is not so much understanding why it is shaped like a doughnut, but what it lacks. Look at the outer ring; you will see 10 sectors, all related to pollution: climate change, ocean acidification, chemical pollution, etc. Something is conspicuously missing and it is not a minor element of the overall picture. It is natural resources and, in particular, non-renewable resources (*)

Natural resources, their depletion, and the related concept of "overshoot" are not just missing from the doughnut, they go mostly unmentioned and unnoticed in the whole book. To give you an example, Raworth mentions only once the 1972 study "The Limits to Growth" that was the first to pinpoint the resource problem. In a discussion of less than two pages, I think her position can be summarized by the following statements:
Mainstream economists were quick to deride the model's design on the basis that it underplayed the balancing feedback of the price mechanism in markets. If non renewable resources became scarce, they argued, prices would rise, triggering greater efficiency in their use, the wider use of substitutes, and exploration for new sources. But in dismissing World 3 and its implied limits to growth , they too quickly dismissed the role and the effect of what the 1970s model simply called pollution ... World 3's modeling of pollution turned out to be prescient.... recent data ... find that the global economy seems to be closely tracking its business-as-usual scenario.
As it is often the case in this book, Raworth's statements need some work to be interpreted because they are always nuanced; if not vague, as when she says one should be "agnostic" about economic growth (**). Here, the interpretation seems to be that The Limits to Growth may have been right, but only because it took into account pollution. Instead, its treatment of non-renewable natural resources was wrong because depletion can be completely neutralized by market factors. Raworth doesn't seem to realize that she is contradicting herself, here: if the "business as usual" scenario produced good results in terms of comparison with the real world's economy, it is because it contained depletion as a major constraint. World 3 could also be run in the hypothesis of infinite natural resources, with pollution the only constraint, but the results would not be the same.

That's the thread of the whole book: natural resources are not a problem; we should be worried only about pollution. Raworth doesn't link the concept of the circular economy to recovering non-renewable resources; she proposes only in relation to abating pollution, with the corollary that it also brings about also better social equality. This is not wrong; it is true that a cyclical "regenerative" economy would be able, in principle, to reduce or eliminate pollution. Still, it is curious how the question of mineral resources is so conspicuously missing in the book.

Kate Raworth is described in the book flap as a "renegade economist", but she still reasons like an economist. The idea that the price mechanism will make depletion always irrelevant is old and it goes back to the 1930s, when the so-called "functional model" was presented, stating exactly what Raworth describes. The idea is that market factors will always re-adjust the system and magically make depletion disappear. By now, the functional model is deeply entrenched in the standard economic thought and there seems to be no way to dislodge it from its preheminent position.

The interesting point is that not only economists tend to dismiss depletion as irrelevant. In recent times, the whole "environmental movement" or the "Greens" have taken exactly the same position. All the debate about climate change is normally based on the supposition that minerals, and in particular fossil fuels, will remain cheap and abundant for the current century. If this is the case, it makes sense to propose to spend untold amounts of money for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) rather than for renewable energy. It goes without saying that, if this assumption turned out to be wrong, the whole exercise of CCS, if it were undertaken at the necessary scale, would turn out to be the greatest resource misplacement of resources in human history, possibly even worse than nuclear energy.

Why is that? As a puzzle, it is difficult to solve. In principle, resource depletion and its negative effects would seem to be easy to understand. Easier than the complex chain of physical factors that leads from the emission of greenhouse gases to disastrous events such as sea level rise, heat waves, hurricanes, and the like. Maybe it is just a question of the lifetime of memes. The meme of depletion started before that of climate change and it is now in its downward trend. Whatever the case, we seem to be locked in a view of the world that misses some fundamental elements of the situation. Where this special form of blindness will lead us is all to be seen. 

Getting back to Raworth's book, despite the criticism above I can also say that it is worth reading for its broad approach and the wealth of concepts it contains. Its discussion on how the science of economics came to be what it is nowadays is, alone, worth the price of the book. Although it misses part of the problem, it may open up new views for you.

(*) You may also have noticed that the concept of "overpopulation" is missing in the doughnut. On this point, Raworth maintains in the text that if people are given the possibility of having a life free of deprivation, they won't reproduce like rabbits - a concept on which I tend to be in agreement; even though its practical implementation in the current world's situation is problematic, to say the least.

(**) The idea of a "zero growth" or "steady state" society would seem to be a fundamental feature of a circular economy, but it is barely mentioned in the book

Friday, September 15, 2017

The Way Nature Works: How Common is the Seneca Curve? Ugo Bardi's Speech at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Ugo Bardi at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence, September 2017. 

My talk at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome was mainly a presentation of my latest book, "The Seneca Effect" (Springer 2017). In practice, of course, a book contains many more things than you can say in a 40 minute speech. So, I tried to concentrate on the idea that the behavior I call "the Seneca Curve" is very common, even universal. Below, you can see the Seneca Curve: things go up slowly but collapse rapidly, as the Roman philosopher Seneca said first some two thousand years ago. You may see the same curve also on the t-shirt I was wearing at the Academy.

You may have heard the old Latin motto, "Natura non facit saltus" (Nature doesn't make jumps) meaning that things change gradually, not abruptly. It may be true in many circumstances but, in practice, it is wholly normal that Nature accumulates energy potentials (as when you inflate a balloon) and then releases them all of a sudden (as when you puncture a balloon). This is the theme of the cover of the German version of my book.

There are reasons why Nature behaves in this way, but the point I made at the school was not so much about why the curve is so common but how human beings are not normally aware of it. In fact, our thought is often shaped by the idea that things will continue evolving the way they have been evolving up to a certain point. Just think about economic growth, and you'll notice how economists expect it to continue forever. It goes without saying that the economy is one of those complex systems which are most vulnerable to the Seneca collapse.

So, I tried to stress that the understanding that the Seneca Curve exists and it is common is a recent discovery. Even though Seneca had understood it by intuition already almost 2000 years ago, in its modern form it is less than a century old. It was proposed for the first time by Jay Forrester in the 1960s and it was enshrined in "The Limits to Growth" study of 1972, even though the term "Seneca Effect" was not used.

During my talk, I showed this image to evidence how our ideas on the path that complex systems follow evolved over time.

You see how modern the idea of "overshoot" (and the subsequent collapse) is. Malthus just didn't have it. Despite being often accused of catastrophism, he couldn't envisage societal collapse; he lacked the necessary intellectual tools. He was an optimist! Today, we have this concept. We know that complex systems tend not just to decline, they tend to collapse. But this perception is totally missing in the general debate.

When you mention societal collapse, there are two possible reactions. The most common one is that such a thing will never happen. Then, if you manage to convince people that it is possible, they endeavor to do everything they can to keep the system going; whatever it takes. They don't realize that when you exceed the carrying capacity of the system, you have to come back, one way or another. And the more you try to stay above the limit, the faster and the harsher the return will be. What you have to do is to ease the collapse, follow it, not try to stop it. Otherwise, it will be worse.

So, we seem to have a cultural stumbling block, here. Maybe we'll never overcome it, or perhaps yes, who knows? In older times, Emperor Marcus Aurelius, a stoic philosopher just like Seneca, had this concept rather clear. He knew that everything in the world is impermanent; including the Roman Empire.  Being a virtuous man, he did everything in his power to do his duty as Emperor. But he recognized his limits and that's what he said in his "Meditations."

We should recognize our limits, too. Follow change, don't try to stop it. Nature is changing all things we see and out of their substance it will make new things in order that the world will be ever new. This is the way Nature works.

Thursday, September 14, 2017

Is it a Bad Idea to Have Fewer Children? Jorgen Randers at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Jorgen Randers speaks at the 1st Summer Academy of the Club of Rome, in Florence, Sep 2017

The Summer Academy of the Club of Rome saw an interesting debate when a young participant asked to take the floor and speak about what he and his group were seeing as a problem: the current tendency of having fewer children. He showed data about the resulting unbalanced age distribution with too many old people who turn out to be a burden for society. And he said that having such an unbalanced distribution could be a disaster in the case of an economic downturn or even a collapse.

Jorgen Randers produced a strong response to this presentation. I am reporting from memory, but I think I am being faithful to the gist of what Randers said, which was something like this:

"Young man, you gave a very bad presentation. I think it was truly horrible and you should stop giving it. You see, the problem you are presenting is a completely fake problem. It comes from the fact that, in the past, an agreement had developed in most Western societies that the families would provide for children, whereas the state would support the elderly. Now, of course, with more old people, the state must pay more. But we forget that having fewer children the burden for families - and for society - is much reduced. So, there is a simple solution to what you see as a problem: raise the retirement age. That's what my country, Norway, did. They leave citizens to choose when to retire, but they give favorable conditions to those who retire later. And most citizens decide to retire at a late age. Look at me: I am 72 years old, I am still working and I think I'll keep working until I turn 85; then maybe I'll retire. But I keep working and I am not living on a pension, so I am not a burden for society. And I am still caring for my 99-year old mother, who is not a burden for the younger generations. So, the problem you pose is mostly of our own creation and it vanishes when compared with the much larger and difficult problem of overpopulation. We need to take into account that there exist limits to growth and that if we want to solve the problem of overpopulation, we need to have fewer children."

This story is interesting for various reasons. Perhaps Randers was too harsh on the young activist, who wasn't saying that we should keep having many children. But it is remarkable how emotionally charged the issue of population is. For some people, any effort aimed at reducing the burden of the human population on the ecosystem amounts to little less than a sacrilege. An insult to the human right to dominate everything which is not human.

On the reasons for this attitude, I can say little, but it seems to be rather common. I was surprised to see it appearing in a meeting dedicated to sustainability and, surely, it has to be even more common outside the world of people concerned with this subject. As a further example of this humanocentric attitude, I think it is appropriate to reproduce here a post that I published last year on "Cassandra's Legacy"

(note: The presentation criticized by Randers is available upon request, just ask me - ugo.bardi(thingette)unifi.it)

Saturday, June 18, 2016
If Switzerland had a Sahara Desert, it would be a small Africa. Does the world really have an "overpopulation problem"?

Dealing with such issues as oil depletion and climate change is already politically and emotionally charged but, at least, these are physical problems that we can examine using the scientific method. But overpopulation? It is the perfect recipe for an instant politicized quarrel.

The movie "Population Boom" by Werner Boote is a good example of how emotional the population question can become. It starts almost immediately with a potshot at the Reverend Malthus, accused to "have predicted a catastrophe for 1860" (something that poor Malthus never said.). Then, it goes on for one hour and a half in the attempt to demonstrate that there is no such a thing as an "overpopulation problem." Rather, the film's thesis is that the world is seeing a conspiracy by the elites of the rich countries who are trying to stop the people in poor countries from having as many children as they want so that they could become rich, too, and challenge the world dominance of the present elites.

If we accept the idea that all opinions are legitimate, then also this one should be - even though probably a bit too extreme for most of us. The problem is that the way the film tries to demonstrate its thesis oscillates between the boring and the silly; without ever providing a serious argument. Mainly, we see the filmmaker, Mr. Werner Boote, walking around while carrying his umbrella in places where it never seems to rain. In his ramblings, Mr. Boote interviews people who, frankly, don't seem to have a clue about overpopulation, except for seeing it as an invention of the evil Western Elites (and the same is true for global warming, explicitly defined as such in one of the interviews).

Most of the arguments made in these interviews are so silly that they are not even worth deconstructing. Just as an example, in a scene we see Mr. Boote (for once without his umbrella) discussing with a man who tells him that Africa is not overpopulated because it has only 40 inhabitants per square km, compared with the 170 of Europe. Then, the man takes Boote somewhere on top of a hill and he shows him an empty landscape, saying, "do you see? Africa is not overpopulated!"

Now, there are several problems here. First, the numbers are wrong, at least in part. The datum for the population density in Africa seems to be correct, but the population density in Europe is 105 inhabitants per square km, not 170. Maybe Mr. Boote's informant meant Western Europe, but if you take that as meaning the European Union, then the population density still is only 116. Then, one would be tempted to remind to Mr. Boote's informant that Europe doesn't have a Sahara desert; to say nothing about the Kalahari desert and other areas unsuitable for human occupation in Africa. So, he conveniently forgets that an African country such as Nigeria has about the same density of population as Switzerland (nearly 200 people per square km), to say nothing about Rwanda, that has 460 people per square km (more than twice than Switzerland). Finally, one could show to Mr. Boote and to his informant the Yosemite Valley or the Death Valley and then tell them: "you see? Almost no one lives in California!

I could go on, but I think this is enough for this movie. Let me just add that if you think that the poor do not pollute the ecosystem, you would do well reading this post by Jacopo Simonetta.

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

The Elephant Skin Table: a Reminder of Human Cruelty at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

One of the participants (*) of the Summer School of the Club of Rome looks at an exhibit of the "La Specola" museum in Florence. This table is made using the skin of an elephant and it was a kind of furniture that was fashionable during the 19th century. The museum has inherited several items of this kind. Correctly they are not normally shown to the public except in special occasions, such as the visit by the participants of the Summer Academy. Yet, these objects remind us a human attitude toward wildlife that's still common among us. 

For many of us, it is a surprise to discover that, today, 97% of the vertebrate biomass on land is composed of humans and of domesticated animals, leaving only 3% for wildlife (these numbers are obviously approximate, but they seem to be reasonably accurate.) 

Apparently, something monstrous has been taking place during the past few centuries: we managed to exterminate most of the Earth's wildlife and we keep at that as if it were the true human purpose on this planet. As the human population continues to increase, the wildlife population must necessarily decrease. How far are we from the time when there will be no wildlife left? In 1970, Isaac Asimov had optimistically estimated as 2430 AD the year when the last animals of the planet would have been killed but, at this rate of increase of the human population, the complete extermination of vertebrates could take place much sooner. It is an enormous change, something that compares with the greatest disasters recorded in the history of the biosphere  

But human beings seem to be unfazed, or at least most of them. Evidently, they are humanocentric and things haven't changed much from the time when the elephant skin table shown in the La Specola museum was made. Humans continue killing everything as they increase in numbers and whatever disputes the human right of appropriating all the spaces and all the resources of the Earth is ruthlessly eliminated.. 

Will humans ever change their attitude? Hard to say but, at least, I saw these numbers shown for the first time in a public debate at the 1st Summer Academy of the Club of Rome, in Florence, in Sep 2017. The issue was raised by the Club's co-President, Ernst von Weizsäcker, who noted already on the first day of the school how most of the current ideas on how the world is supposed to work were developed in an age when the earth was almost empty of human beings. 

Today, von Weizsäcker noted, the situation is completely different and he mentioned the data about the 3% of wildlife remaining. Then, we should change the way we see the world; challenging the humanocentric view of the world that remains entrenched in the mainstream environmental movement. 

Yet, this information didn't seem to make inroads in the discussion. As far as I can tell, it was never mentioned again in any of the many sessions of the Summer School in Florence. Let's say that von Weizsäcker's talk was a start, at least; but was it already too late?

*(image reproduced with the kind permission of Joséphine von Mitschke-Collande, who appears in the photo)

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

A depressed man with a smiling face: Jorgen Randers speaks at the Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence

This is not a picture taken at the summer school, but it is Jorgen Randers, the real one!

Jorgen Randers' speech at the Summer School at the Club of Rome has been dramatically different from the standard speech dealing with sustainability. Randers defined himself as a "depressed man with a smiling face" and he summarized his 47 years of work to promote sustainability as an utter failure. "We are worse off now," he said, "than we were 50 years ago. 

What went wrong? Randers asked to the audience to propose reasons. He got more than a dozen, from the financial system to greed. But he said that none of these is the real reason. It is not a fault of the government, it is not a fault of corporations, it is not a fault of banks. It is, simply, the fault of people. According to Randers, people are simply unable to postpone their immediate satisfaction for a better future. And that's the problem today as it was 50 years ago.

Randers supported his opinion with the example of Norway, the country where he comes from. He said that he and other scientists had prepared a plan that would have zeroed the country's emission by 2050 at a cost of some Eur 200 per person per year for 50 years. It was refused at all levels. The rich and well-educated people of Norway prefer to have an extra 200 Eurs to spend shopping in London rather than give an example of good management of the ecosystem to the world.

Randers's talk arose some strong reactions in the audience, some quite unfavorable. But, really, it made a sorely needed point: we are still reasoning as we were reasoning 50 years ago. We are creating environmental activists who are supposed to push people and governments to do something good for the environment. It doesn't seem to work. Not well enough for what we need to do, at least. And the batch of young activists being prepared at the summer school may face a task that will turn out to be even more difficult than it was for the previous generation.

So, what to do? Difficult to say, but at least asking the right questions is a good starting point

Monday, September 11, 2017

Testing the MEDEAS world model during the Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence

The Summer School of the Club of Rome in Florence. Above: one of discussion groups engaged in proposing parameters to be run with the MEDEAS world model. In the back, standing, Ilaria Perissi (researcher at the University of Florence) and Jordi Sole (Coordinator of the MEDEAS project). 

A Comment by Gianni Comoretto

42 years ago, when I was 16, I read “The Limits of growth” and it changed my life. I was already worried about things like pollution and overpopulation, but I did not suspect the entity of these problems. I was fascinated by these models, by the possibility to at least have hints of the future we were approaching. I learned programming and I was even able to put the simplest models in a programmable hand-held calculator (a Texas SR52), and some years later on an AppleII. I began to tackle more seriously the problems of an exponential growth in a finite world, sustainable development, renewable energies, energy efficiency…

Therefore when I heard that the Club of Rome was organizing a summer academy in my city, I subscribed enthusiastically. Even after 42 years of activism and study, I have plenty of things to learn. And I met about a hundred of wonderful persons down all over the world. Some I know from a long time, some were for me just names on the front pages of books and papers I read. Most of them much younger than me. Saturday we were presented a new, much improved model of the world resources, society and economy, developed as part of a European framework program. It is much more detailed than the original one, but the basic results are quite similar, and equally gloomy than those of 45 years ago: in the “business as usual” scenario the global economy will still be able to grow for a few years, slowing down until, in 15-20 years, it will begin to collapse very quickly, leaving little behind. 

But this is a school, and the best way to learn is trying. So we divided into 3 groups, and each one had to decide which measures were necessary to guarantee at least a minimum of energy and services for everybody. We settle to 30-40 gigajoule per person per year (about 1 kW of average power use). Of the three groups mine was the only one to be able to guarantee this level at least up the end of the century, basically by adopting: an immediate “controlled recession” of 1% per year a decrease in the global population at a rate of 0.5% per year, that we considered feasible just preventing unwanted pregnancy and increasing women education an increase of 22.5% per year of the installed renewable energy capabilities measures to control the financial market, to reduce inequalities massive reforestation 

Other groups were less aggressive, both in the PIL decrease and in the necessity of installing renewable energies. As a result, their economy stayed significantly higher than ours for a couple of decades, but collapsed only a bit later than in the “business as usual” model. Our controlled recession strategy gave us more time to implement renewables, that in the end saved the day to our slightly reduced population. This lesson taught us lots of things. First, even among people dedicated to these problems, it is not easy to understand what is really necessary. Renewables are not a luxury, and we have not much time to implement them. Last but not least, we will never win the next elections with our program.

Below, Sara Falsini, researcher at the University of Florence (white shirt, standing), engaged with another group of testers of the MEDEAS model.

The role of Asia in the world: a speech by Chandran Nair at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Chandran Nair speaking today (Sep 11, 2017) at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence.

I am trying to follow all that's being said at the Summer Academy of the Club of Rome, and it is difficult. Truly, a lot is being said and discussed and much of it is hugely interesting and stimulating. I'll try to report about at least some of the discussions and, today, I was especially impressed by the talk of Chandran Nair, chairman of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT) Institute. 

After Yugay's presentation of yesterday, Nair brought another non-Western viewpoint to the school, in this case from Asia. As you see in the picture, above, Nair notes that this region includes a larger population than the rest of the world. He argues strongly that the "West" has lost or is losing its former leadership in culture, science, and politics, and that it is now time for Asia to assert a new role and pick up the sustainability challenge for the whole world. 

Nair's presentation was hugely successful with the participants and it generated plenty of questions and discussions, as you see in the pictures below.

Rather than trying to summarize Nair's talk myself, I think I can reproduce a recent paper of him for the World Economic Forum, below. But there is a lot more to learn from Nair's ideas and insights.


After 50 years of progress, it's time for ASEAN's next economic revolution

By Chandran Nair
For the World Economic Forum

This year on 8 August, South-East Asia celebrates an important anniversary: it will be 50 years since the Bangkok Declaration, which established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was signed. The organization at the time was much smaller, with a combined population of just 184 million. Member states were largely undeveloped; even Singapore, the wealthiest member, only had a GDP per capita of $600. Indonesia, the largest and poorest member, had a GDP per capita of $56. Almost three-quarters of ASEAN’s population lived in rural areas.

Half a century of population growth and the addition of six new members has tripled ASEAN’s population to 625 million. Only China, India and the European Union have bigger populations. ASEAN countries have also undergone significant development. Singapore is an advanced economy. Thailand and Malaysia are comfortably middle-income. The Philippines has one of the region’s fastest growing economies, helped in part by a highly-educated, English-speaking and globally competitive population. Indonesia’s massive and growing population will make it one of the world’s most important countries, and Vietnam’s rapid growth may make it a model for economic development and poverty alleviation akin to China.

ASEAN’s record of development, poverty alleviation and conflict resolution is a true success story. Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, has called ASEAN a catalyst for peace, a geopolitical miracle and the most successful regional organization after the European Union.

But ASEAN’s economic success has brought with it new challenges. One example is ASEAN’s forests, some of the world’s oldest, which were cleared to make way for agricultural and commodity production: ASEAN’s forest coverage has been reduced from 72% in 1970 to 42% today. More than that, the solutions to these challenges will not come from outside the region. ASEAN’s next 50 years will take place in a wholly new geopolitical, economic and environmental context. The solutions previously used by other countries are no longer feasible in a world marked by increasing interdependence, growing disparities, environmental degradation, climate change and increasingly strict resource constraints.

But there will also be new opportunities to develop even bolder ideas for regional cooperation and coexistence, along with strategies that may be better than what has come before.

Sunday, September 10, 2017

Resource wars and the current geopolitical unrest as seen from Russia. A speech from Tatiana Yugay at the 1st Summer Academy of the Club of Rome in Florence

Professor Tatiana Yugay of Plekhanov University in Moscow speaks at the first summer academy of the Club of Rome in Florence. 

The Summer Academy of the Club of Rome is in full swing in Florence. Many things are being discussed and I'll see to present a summary of the main points in future posts. Here, I think I can already start with the presentation by professor Tatiana Yugay who brought to the school a voice from outside the Western World. Professor Yugay is an expert in geopolitical issues and, in particular, she works on questions related to oil and gas. Her thesis at the meeting was that much of the current world unrest can be seen as the result of the ongoing wars for mineral resources which are becoming scarce. She also noted that this situation may be one of the main causes for the rising inequality trends almost everywhere in the world.

In the following, an example of prof. Yugay's work in this field.


This is an abridged version of a review of Douglas Reynolds' book "Cold War Energy" by Tatiana Yugay and Ugo Bardi published on Energy Research & Social ScienceVolume 34, December 2017, Pages 200-201. For the complete text, write me (ugo.bardi(thingything)unifi.it).

Book Review

Cold War Energy. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, D. Reynolds. Alaska Chena LLC, Alaska (2016).

The fall of empires is a much-studied subject, but also one where an agreement on the cause (or causes) of the fall seems to be extremely difficult to find. For, instance, in the case of the Roman Empire, Demandt [1] describes some 210 theories on why Rome fell, and this is probably an incomplete list. Overall, however, we can divide this domain into two main subsets: theories based on several independent causes acting together (concauses) and theories based on a single cause that generates a cascade of different effects. An example of the first approach – many concauses – is the recent study by Cline on the Bronze Age Civilization [2]. The other approach is probably best represented by John Tainter’s study “The Collapse of Complex Societies” [3] where he identifies a general factor in the decline and fall of civilizations and empires as the “diminishing returns of complexity.”
Douglas Reynolds’ book, “Cold War Energy” examines the most recent case of the fall of a large empire, that of the Soviet Union. It does so falling straight into the camp of the proponents of “single cause collapse.” In this case, Reynolds identifies this cause as the peak of oil production in the Soviet Union, in turn related to the increasing costs of production generated by progressive depletion. 
With some exceptions [4] Reynolds’ interpretation is clearly minoritary. In Russia, today, the prevalent opinion seems to be that the Union’s fall was due to the mistakes, or the outright betrayal, of the secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev. In the West, a commonly reported opinion is that the fall of the Soviet Union was the result of a secret agreement between the leaders of the US, UK, and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis agreed to flood the market with cheap petroleum and this caused a loss of revenues for the Soviet Union that depended on petroleum exports for its economy. In general, the most common interpretations focus on shortcomings of the Soviet economic system, namely the lack of the incentives produced by the free market that prevented the Union from attaining the same efficiency of the West in resource exploitation.
Reynolds’ interpretation, instead, is original and interesting since it turns completely around the way the subject is normally discussed. Reynolds focuses on the Union’s strengths, rather than its shortcomings. Reynolds makes the bold step of trying to look for similarities – rather than for differences – between the Soviet Bloc and the Western Bloc. 
Reynolds’ analysis leads us to follow the trajectories of the two superpowers of the 20th century, the USA and the USSR. Reynolds uses the modern concept of energy return on investment (EROI) to show that both countries faced increasing costs of extraction for the vital resource that was crude oil. Neither was able to allocate sufficient capital resources to continue the growing production trend and both went through a production peak. Reynolds makes a strong case for peak oil being a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union and he also notes the relevance that this interpretation may have on our modern globalized world which is facing a global peak in the oil production, right in this period. The ongoing social and political turmoil, notes Reynolds, can be seen as similar to the events that brought down the Soviet Union. 
A weak point of the book is that it remains strongly focused on the Soviet Union but doesn’t make an in-depth comparison with how the peaking phenomenon played out in other regions of the world. There are other cases of states that collapsed or went into economic crisis and political turmoil in correspondence with their productive peak: one is Iran, which peaked around 1975, shortly thereafter experiencing the collapse of the ruling Pahlavi dynasty. Other, more recent, cases of peaking followed by turmoil are those of Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. None of these cases are discussed in the book, although an extensive comparison is made with the case of the United States, whose oil production peaked in 1970. Also here, however, we lack an explicit explanation of why the peaking of the internal energy production had such different effects on these two large producing regions. If peak oil is the underlying factor of the collapse of complex societies, why are we talking about the “Former Soviet Union” and not of the “Former United States of America?” (even though the latter term might become useful in a non-remote future).
Reynolds is very passionate about his peak oil hypothesis as the cause of the Soviet collapse that, helps him to further develop and enrich the macroeconomic analysis. On the other hand, we should all be wary of the old saying that goes as ‘when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail'. It is valid for peak oil as well.


Ugo Bardi is a member of the Club of Rome and the author of "Extracted: how the quest for mineral resources is plundering the Planet" (Chelsea Green 2014). His most recent book is "The Seneca Effect" to be published by Springer in mid 2017